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INTRODUCTION. This is the third report of the Subcom-
mittee on International Law and Relations ("Subcommittee")
made pursuant to a Ford Foundation grant to the American Society
of International Law. The grant supports activities of the Sub-
committee with respect to the international law of the sea negotia-
tions and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea ("Conference"). The first report consisted of recommenda-
tions for research prior to the first substantive session of the Con-
ference. The second report, printed in this issue, consists of an
account and analysis of the proceedings at the Caracas session of
the Conference together with recommendations for intersessional
research.
The present report contains a brief introduction setting forth
* This is the third report of the Subcommittee on International Law and Rela-
tions of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea. The Committee,
established in 1972, is composed of private citizens appointed by the Chairman
of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea
to "provide adequate representation of the diverse interests involved in the law
of the sea." Members of the Committee serve solely in an advisory capacity
and the views stated herein do not necessarily represent those of the United
States Government.
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salient data concerning the Geneva session of the Conference, a
general discussion of the organizational and procedural aspects of
the session, and an analysis of the outcome with particular ref-
erence to the "Informal Single Negotiating Text." It concludes
with some recommendations for further intersessional research.
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
The third (second substantive) session of the Conference was
held in Geneva, Switzerland, from March 17 to May 10, 1975.
The session continued the substantive work begun at the Caracas
meeting held from June 20-August 29, 1974. Approximately 140
states participated in the Geneva session. No treaty or treaties
dealing with the law of the sea were adopted, however, and in
concluding its work the Conference decided to recommend to the
General Assembly that a third substantive session be held in New
York City from March 29-May 21, 1976, and that the Conference
be empowered to decide then whether an additional session will be
needed during the summer of 1976.
II. PROCEDURE
Most observers of the Geneva session perceived a greater will-
ingness on the part of most delegates to negotiate seriously and to
seek compromise solutions. This compared favorably with the rhe-
torical "position taking" atmosphere which prevailed during the
Caracas session. Nonetheless, it was apparent from an early date
that it would not be possible to secure the desired treaty during
the Geneva session and, indeed, that a target date of late 1976 was
as optimistic an outlook as could be found.
There was very limited use at the Geneva session of formal
meetings of the Conference or its main committees, and greatly
more use was made of working sessions of the main committees
and private group meetings such as those of the "Evensen Group,"
chaired by Mr. Jens Evensen of Norway. The pattern during
the early weeks of the session was one of committee or informal
group meetings in the morning with afternoons devoted to meet-
ings of informal specialized interest or negotiating groups. There
was, in fact, a plethora of such informal groups which, though
producing a more practical negotiating atmosphere, created in the
case of the Evensen Group some resentment on the part of a few
delegations not invited to participate. A table of formal and informal
groups active at Geneva, prepared by Ann L. Hollick, is appended
to this paper as Annex A.
The negotiations proceeded quite slowly during the first half
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of the session and, in an attempt to accelerate the process of reach-
ing agreement, Conference President Amerasinghe proposed at one
point that negotiations take place in consultative groups based on
regional representation. That proposal was rejected, however, and
thereafter the existing procedures and organizations were con-
tinued. A second proposal by Amerasinghe met with Conference
approval. He asked that the chairman and officers of each of the
three main committees prepare a single unified negotiating text to
serve as the basis for future negotiating or voting efforts, such texts to
take account of the work of the formal and informal groups of
the Conference.' It was expressly understood that such texts were
not to be binding on the delegations, but would provide a single
text from which negotiations could further progress.
III. OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA SESSION
A. Substance of the Informal Text
As a result of the acceptance of Amerasinghe's second pro-
posal, the Geneva session of the Conference produced the "In-
formal Single Negotiating Text. "2 The Informal Text consists of
three main parts, each being a draft prepared by the chairman of
one of the three main committees and dealing with the subject al-
located to that committee. In addition, there is a draft of articles
dealing with compulsory dispute settlement, prepared by the Con-
ference President based upon the product of an informal working
group.
It was commonly understood that the Committee I text was
largely the work of the chairman of the working group, Christo-
pher Pinto of Sri Lanka, who had been endeavoring to establish
a common ground between developing and developed nations by
the use of a compromise approach in the "Pinto Paper." The
Committee Chairman, Paul Engo of Cameroon, however, exten-
sively rewrote the Pinto draft with the result that it leans far more
toward the Group of 77 position than had earlier Pinto drafts. It
consists of 75 articles dealing with general principles, the seabed
authority and its machinery, and questions of finance. The An-
nex on basic conditions of exploration and exploitation was, how-
ever, prepared by Pinto and transmitted by his working group to the
main committee. Committee I seems to be the only Conference
committee in which agreement is still not within reach. By the end
of the session it was clear that there was a mutual distrust between
I See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.54 (18 April 1975) at 3.
2 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62WP.8/Parts I, I1, and III (6 and 7 May 1975);
And SD.Gp/2d Session/No. 1/Rev. 5 (1 May 1975).
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the developed and the developing nations regarding one another's
proposals for the operating of the seabed authority and that there
was little likelihood of a common meeting ground. The developing
countries wish to see the seabed authority as an "Enterprise"
controlled by them with the power to discriminate in their favor
and to develop independently as an "Enterprise" seabed resources,
which would be "banked" during the initial years in which mining
operations would be conducted by the developed nations. 3 The
developed powers, in turn, were distrustful of the fairness with
which such an "Enterprise" would be operated and feared, quite
logically, that it could result in an OPEC-like cartel. The issues
here are ideological and are connected closely with the drive of the
developing countries for a "new economic order" in which the
wealth of the developed countries would be redistributed. The
powers and structure of the international seabed authority and the
methods to be used for the exploitation of the manganese nodules
have thus become enmeshed in a larger dispute about a "just" divi-
sion of the world's economic resources.
The text presented by Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, Chairman
of Committee II, consists of 137 articles and covers the territorial
sea and contiguous zone, straits used for international navigation,
the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, high seas, land-
locked states, archipelagos, regime of islands, enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas, territories under foreign occupation or colonial dom-
ination, and settlement of disputes. The basis for this text included
a lengthy working paper with alternative articles as well as docu-
ments produced by the Evensen Group, the Group of 77, and func-
tional negotiating groups. The text represents a compromise ac-
ceptable to some nations insofar as the major principles are con-
cerned, but there are a number of inconsistencies and purely
drafting matters which will need to be dealt with in subsequent
negotiating sessions. There are also some points about the draft
which should raise serious concerrr among United States Govern-
ment negotiators (some of these questions are identified in An-
nex B, prepared by Lewis M. Alexander).
The text for Committee III was the product of the Committee
Chairman Alexander Yankov of Bulgaria, his bureau, and the heads
of the working groups on scientific research (Cornel Metternich
of West Germany) and pollution (Jose Luis Vallarta of Mexico).
It consists of 44 articles on the marine environment, 37 articles on
3 See Murphy, Deep Ocean Mining: Beginning of a New Era, p. 46 infra, (ed.
footnote).
[Vol. 8: 33
INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT
marine scientific research, and 11 articles on development and
transfer of technology. Included in the text are several articles
that were actually negotiated in the respective working groups.
The working group on pollution produced negotiated articles on
monitoring, environmental assessment, standards for land-based
sources (with alternative formulations concerning double stan-
dards), and pollution from dumping of wastes at sea. The working
group on science and transfer of technology issued possible consoli-
dated texts, including some alternative provisions, on the conduct
and promotion of marine scientific research, the legal status of
installations for marine scientific research, and responsibility and
liability. As a result of some confusion concerning the respective
jurisdiction of Committees II and III over pollution from ships in
the economic zone, further negotiations will be needed on that sub-
ject, and the Evensen Group is likely to consider the matter at its
planned intersessional meeting.
The provisions on compulsory settlement of disputes contain
four introductory articles followed by two main annexes. Although
an attempt was made to arrive at one single negotiating text,
various difficulties were encountered resulting in a compromise
which proved acceptable to a vast majority of the participating
delegations, namely that any contracting party, when ratifying the
Convention may choose one of three methods of settlement -
arbitration, law of the sea tribunal, or the International Court of
Justice. Consequently, when a case is brought against a con-
tracting party it has to be brought before the forum chosen by that
party. This solution has the advantage of allowing greater
flexibility in the choice of the forum by a particular State; it avoids
the imposition on all States of one single method; and it thus pro-
vides more respect for the sovereign right of a State to choose the
weapon with which it wants to fight its legal battles. Neverthe-
less, this solution was objected to by delegations which thought
that the method they preferred - for instance the International
Court of Justice - was so much better than the others that it
should be universal. Objections were raised also by those who did
not really like the idea of having to accept any procedure leading
to a binding decision. Others - the so-called "functionalists" -
were willing to accept the idea of binding decision-making for only
a few selected areas (e.g., seabed beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction, or fisheries, or scientific research, or pollution), but
were opposed to it for the remainder of the Convention. A third
group, while accepting binding decision-making in principle, argued
that in areas under national jurisdiction (internal waters, territorial
1976]
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sea, continental shelf, and economic zone) only national courts
should have jurisdiction, except where some important internation-
al rights (such as freedom of navigation) were concerned.
B. Status of the Informal Text
The political and legal implications of the Informal Text are
important. In his report on the Geneva session made to the Com-
mission to Study the Organization of Peace, Professor Louis B.
Sohn observed that:
While the four parts of the text are supposed to represent
only the opinions of the chairmen of the various committees
who prepared them, they are in fact based largely on drafts pre-
pared by various working groups and reflect a large measure of
consensus. Nevertheless, these texts are not considered "ne-
gotiated" or compromise texts, and are merely intended to serve
as a basis for the next session of the Conference . . . . Del-
egations are free to propose further amendments but have been
requested to work jointly on them and to prepare composite
proposals rather than a mass of unrelated amendments.
Further indication of the political and legal status of the infor-
mal texts was given when representatives of the United States
Government appeared before Congressional Committees to report
on the progress of the negotiations at Geneva. In testimony be-
fore the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on May 19, 1975, Pro-
fessor John Norton Moore, Chairman of the National Security
Council's Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force, stated:
Although the single text is not a fully negotiated or consen-
sus document, it is in important respects, at least in regard to
Committees II and III, an indication of an overall package nec-
essary for a satisfactory treaty . . . . Even though it is not a
negotiated or consensus text, the preparation of the single text
is a significant and necessary step toward a treaty. For the
first time, the Conference will be able to focus on a specific
text rather than a multitude of alternatives and national pro-
posals . . . I believe that for the most part, at least for the work
of Committees II and IL1, it also reflects a widely shared view
about the nature of the overall package in a manner conducive
to the achievement of a realistic and widely acceptable Treaty.
At that same hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas
Clingan, of the Office of Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, observed that:
The single negotiating text must be viewed as a procedural
device providing the basis for further negotiations, and is not a
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negotiated text or an agreed compromise. It does not affect
any nation's national position . . . . Its roots are in the nego-
tiations, and it is not to be seen as arbitrary or without sub-
stance. In some areas it reflects shared views.
According to these observations it is fair to conclude that the
Informal Text is not binding and has no legal effect. As far as
the United States is concerned, Part II does nonetheless reflect
essentially what an acceptable ultimate agreement would look
like on the subjects with which it deals. Part III also appears to
be a negotiated product and, with some modification, may be ac-
ceptable to the United States on the subjects with which it deals.
Part I is essentially the negotiating position of the Group of 77, the
text not reflecting any consensus or compromise at this stage.
Acceptability of provisions by various nations or groups of na-
tions aside, the Informal Text does represent a watershed develop-
ment in the negotiations since for the first time delegates will
have a single provision on each issue to use as the basis for further
negotiations. Such "first drafts" or "reports," with regard to any
negotiation or subject, often tend to take on a life of their own -
that is, they strongly affect and direct negotiations from that point
forward, carrying almost a presumption of agreement unless strong
objections are voiced, as they have in the case of the Committee I
text. Major effort tends to be turned in such situations to fine
points of drafting, reconciling conflicting provisions, and to consid-
eration of interpretation of language. It becomes progressively
more difficult, as such single texts remain the basis for negotia-
tion, to make major alterations in the substance of significant
provisions.
Negotiations on the Informal Text will probably first revolve
about attempts by some nations to make major changes in articles
or texts with which they are fundamentally dissatisfied. This
approach can be expected, for example, on the part of developed
nations with respect to the Committee I text, although it does not
seem likely that major alterations will be attempted with respect to
the Committee II and III texts.
Even if no written agreement is derived from future negotia-
tions, the Informal Text could still play a profound role in the de-
velopment of customary international law. The portions that have
been highly negotiated probably reflect the expectations of most
nations and they will tend to conform, in state practice, to the
principles set forth in the document. Where there is philosophi-
cal divergence, as is the case with the Committee I text, likely
national actions can also be expected to follow on from the text -
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developing nations seeking total control of seabed mining activities,
developed nations opposing that approach and authorizing their
nationals to engage in such mining activities. Thus, whether the
Conference produces a desired treaty or not, the Informal Text
may in one sense or another provide a reliable indicator of the fu-
ture direction of the law of the sea.
IV. SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As has been done in both earlier reports of the Subcommittee,
recommendations for possible further research are set forth in this
section. Although such recommendations have in the past dealt
with quite specific substantive matters, most of those set forth below
deal with procedural matters or assessment of values involved in
the negotiations.
1. Has the Conference already served its most useful purposes:
clarification of issues, communication of positions on the issues,
and an understanding of the linkages among the various issues?
In the present context, is unilateral or coordinated multilateral
action desirable?
In addressing these questions the alternatives should not be viewed
too starkly - to continue with the Conference or walk out of it -
but should rather be seen in terms of the various national interests
involved on a topic by topic basis. To what extent, for example,
has the Conference already become part of an on-going customary
law-making process? Does it succeed only if it produces a widely
accepted and comprehensive law of the sea treaty or are there other
values which can be derived from its continuation? How would
unilateral or coorditlated multilateral action (particularly 200-mile
fishing zones and deep seabed mining authorizations) affect the
ability of the Conference to achieve its express objective or alterna-
tive thereto?
2. Which nations' interests would be better served by the adop-
tion of a compromise treaty and which by the development of the
law of the sea through customary international law?
Though involving some difficult matters of judgment, such a
study would prove extremely enlightening both in assessing the
attitudes of particular nations toward the Conference and in judg-
ing what future courses of action they might take in the event of
a Conference failure. Obviously, such an inquiry would have to
be made on a subject by subject basis, though the overall impact
of one format over the other should be considered. Such a study
would require an identification of interests to be analyzed; dif-
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ferentiation between short, medium, and long term interests; dif-
ferentiaton between narrow, parochial interests and broader inter-
ests in world order; likely possible outcomes of the Conference in
terms of substantive agreement; and likely scenarios in the event
of non-agreement. It would probably be most practical if a quite
limited number of key states or groups of states were selected
for analysis.
3. What is likely to be the ultimate impact of the philosophi-
cal debate on the seabed mining question (Committee I) and how
might this apparent impasse be resolved?
Several sub-issues should be addressed in such a study: (1)
how pervasive are external influences on the Conference negotia-
tions; (2) specifically, is the question of a seabed mining regime
more linked to the question of cartelization of raw materials or to
other law of the sea issues; (3) would it be practicable to sever
the seabed question from the negotiations; and (4) what would be
the relative advantages and disadvantages of approving a treaty
based on Parts II and III of the Informal Text, sending Part I
back to a revived Seabed Committee of more limited composition?
4. What is the value of the Informal Text?
As noted in this report, such documents tend to take a "life of
their own," but the implications of that "life" are uncertain. This
issue should be examined both from the standpoint of the Text as
leading to accepted written agreement and as affecting customary
law development in the event of a Conference failure.
5. From a United States point of view, are the detailed pro-
visions of the Informal Text acceptable as they presently stand?
What modifications, if any, would be required to reach that stage
of acceptability?
In considering this issue, attention should not only be focused
on an article-by-article assessment, but also on general negotiat-
ing tactics; that is, what articles might be improved from the United
States point of view in terms of sacrifices on other articles? More
broadly, which packages of articles might be improved at the ex-
pense of other interests? Although it might extend the scope of
such an inquiry too far, it would nonetheless be useful to discuss
external bargaining elements in such an analysis.
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ANNEX A
GRouPs AT LOS-3
Compiled by Ann L. Hollick
Official Conference Groups
Conference (Bureau) General Committee (48 members)
Committee I (Bureau) Working Group (of 50) - Chairman's
private consultative groups
Committee It (Bureau) Informal consultative groups (all mem-
bers - with working groups of smaller sizes for some issues):
1. Baselines Working Group
2. Historic Bays and Historic Waters Working Group
3. Contiguous Zone Working Group
4. Innocent Passage Working Group
5. High Seas Working Group
6. Land-locked and Geographically Disadvantaged Work-
ing Group on Access to the sea (8 transit and 5 land-
locked)
7. Continental Shelf
8. Exclusive Economic Zone
9. Straits
10. Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas
11. Islands
12. Delimitation
Committee III (Bureau) two working groups - Chairman's
private drafting and negotiating groups
Credentials Committee
Drafting Committee
II. Semi-official Negotiation Groups
Dispute Settlement Group
Juridical Experts (Evensen Group consisting of heads of delega-
tions)
III. Ad Hoc or Miscellaneous Issue-oriented Groups
Group of 17 - pollution
Group of 5 - security and transit
Group of 13 - science
Amorphous Group - science
Honduras Group on Continental Shelf
UK/Fiji Group on Straits
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IV. Regional Groups
African Group - Ivory Coast chairman
Latin American Group - Contacts to Committee I (Rattray)
and 11 (Ajala)
1. Caribbean States
2. Central American States
Asian - Asian group of Group of 77
Arab - separate meetings on each committee
WEO
European Economic Community
East European
V. Interest Groups
Group of 77 (Bureau) Kedadi chairman
Committee I - Working Group (Bureau) Contact Group
Committee II - Contact Group (Njenga chairman)
Committee III - Working Group - Contact Group Iraq chair-
man
Archipelagic States
Oceanic States
Land-locked and Geographically Disadvantaged - 48 members
(Turkey chairman)
Committee I Working Group (Czechoslovakia chairman)
Committee II - Contact Group questions of Transit
Working Group on Marine Scientific Research (Nether-
lands chairman)
Land-locked states of Group of 77
Straits States
Territorialist Group
Coastal States (transformed into Evensen Group)
VI. Luncheon Clubs
Dredge and Drill
Fishhook
Defense Lunch
Science Club Lunch
1976)
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ANNEX B
SOME CRITICISMS OF PART II OF THE
INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT IN TERMS
OF UNITED STATES OCEAN INTERESTS
Compiled by Lewis M. Alexander
1. There is a provision for a contiguous zone beyond terri-
torial limits, up to 24 miles from shore. The U.S. has opposed
such a zone on the grounds that it might be taken as a security
zone. There is no mention of the zone as a security zone in the text.
2. Within straits used for international navigation there is
provision for straits States regulating certain aspects of transit pas-
sage.
3. Mention is made in the straits articles of their connecting
"high seas or an exclusive economic zone." The U.S. is pressing
hard for the status of the extra-territorial waters of the economic
zone to be that of high seas.
4. Within the exclusive economic zone, coastal State jurisdic-
tion would extend over scientific research and pollution control
and abatement. This is partially negated by provisions in Part
III, but it is in Part II.
5. The provisions for internationalization of highly migratory
species within the economic zone are extremely weak. Also,
whales and porpoises are included in the list of highly-migratory
species to be regulated by regional organizations.
6. There are no specifics for fixing the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin.
7. There is no mention of a boundary review commission to
pass on the suitability of a coastal State's designation of its outer
seabed limits, nor is there mention of the permanence of boundaries
once fixed or of the integrity of foreign investment in seabed re-
sources beyond the economic zone.
8. The International Authority is given the right to determine
rates of contribution by developing countries from seabed resource
exploitation beyond the economic zone.
9. On archipelagos there was no decision on the percentage of
baselines which could be greater than 80 nautical miles in length,
nor on the breadth of the sealanes; and the definition of an atoll
is a poor one. By this definition the Bahamas are not an archi-
pelago, since their land/water ratio is greater than 1:1.
10. Under "Islands" there is a provision that rocks which can-
not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
[Vol. 8:33
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have no exclusive economic zone or territorial sea. The U.K.
would probably refuse to ratify such a treaty.
11. Part II retains the reference both to "enclosed" and "semi-
enclosed" seas, without distinguishing between them. It also re-
tains the requirement that they be connected with the ocean by a
narrow outlet, thereby ruling out a number of otherwise bona fide
semi-enclosed seas (e.g., the North Sea and the Gulf of Thailand).
12. The provisions for boundary delimitation between opposite
or adjacent continental shelves or economic zones are a step back-
ward from the 1958 Convention in that they make no specific
reference to special circumstance situations.
